"Soft law or no law ? The European Parliament's new role in the management of organized interests" by Lehmann, Wilhelm.
10th EUSA Meeting
Panel 8D: What difference has the lack of a constitution
made to the work of the European Parliament? Views from the inside
Chair and Discussant: John Peterson (University of Edinburgh),
Soft law or no law ? The European Parliament's
new role in the management of organized interests
Wilhelm Lehmann,
European Parliament, Brussels*
Abstract
The European Parliament continues to evolve into a classical parliamentary institution. It 
becomes more political (in terms of party politics) and deals with issues touching upon 
people's daily lives, thus creating incentives for new methods of participation in EU policy-
making. In a changing regulatory environment there are, however, less legislative dossiers of 
a redistributive nature and more decision-making on the legal framework shaping the 
activities of economic operators and creating a tension between private actors' rights and the 
interests of public authorities. The paper intends to assess, on the one hand, the impact of 
new preferences for legal or para-legal instruments and of institutional demands on the 
methods and strategies of interest representation. On the other hand, it seeks to clarify the 
relationship between private interest preferences concerning the extent of regulation and the 
choice of governance tools by the EU legislator.
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1 Introduction 
Current research on lobbying still starts in most cases from a clear distinction between public 
and private actors which operate according to very different rules and principles. While 
public actors are seen to apply a top-down approach from basic political tenets (e.g., social 
justice or economic competitiveness) to their practical implementation in specific legislation, 
private parties acting in markets are usually described to operate in fluid, multi-dimensional, 
and net-worked surroundings requiring rapid ad hoc problem-solving measures. 
Furthermore, public actors are usually seen to be the hierarchically superior part in the 
public-private relationship: only they can adopt binding rules for society as a whole and, at 
least in principle, it is up to them to what extent they allow special interests to bear on their 
regulatory and legislative activity. Despite twenty years of intensive academic work on 
(multi-level) governance and regulation and at least as many years of public discourse 
favouring deregulation and lean government this juxta-position between the government as 
the ultimate decision-maker and the private firm/association as the object of such decisions is 
still very prominent in the lobbying literature (Schneider 2004), and perhaps correctly so. Has 
lobbying research as an academic field been somewhat isolated from other fields of social 
science or is it precisely because of the subject matter of lobbying research that it does not see 
the priorities, instruments and procedures of public and private institutions as similar as 
some pluralist network theorists would have it?
Another question is more specifically related to the study of the European Union. Interest 
representation, particularly at the European level, has long been seen by functionalists as 
instrumental for the increase of the supranational institutions' autonomy (Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz 1998). At the same time, European governance is characterised by much less 
spending power and hierarchical implementation instruments than national governments, 
hence providing a case study of "governance with less government" (if not "governance 
without  government").1 However, the trend towards deregulation and intensive public-
private partnerships has been observed in parallel at both the national and the European 
level. Therefore, the second question raised here is the following: given that the multi-level 
structure of EU governance has mostly been more open and malleable to outside interests 
than close-knit and hierarchical national administrations, has the European level of 
governance benefited from a relative weakening of national state structures through
deregulation? If so, has transnational interest representation played a role different from that 
of (increasing) lobbying at the national level? Finally, do European public institutions such as 
the European Commission and the European Parliament have different institutional demands 
on European interest representation than national governments on national lobbyists?2 Or are 
they more easily captured by powerful trans-European associations which have the support 
of some national governments in the Council?
The rise of the European Parliament as co-legislator is one institutional change which has 
certainly restructured European governance. Not many years ago, it seemed natural that a 
description of the lobbying arena which gradually emerged in Brussels did not merit a 
separate chapter on the role of the European Parliament in EC decision making - and the 
   
1 In the words of constitutionalist Joseph Weiler: The EU is "constructed with a top-to-bottom hierarchy 
of norms, but with a bottom-to-top hierarchy of authority and real power" (Weiler 2001: 57).
2 Michalowitz claims that "an organised market of lobbying [in Brussels] seems to have developed 
precisely due to [the European institutions'] active influence on lobbying behaviour" (2004: 92). For a 
more skeptical view of the differences between national and European lobbying practices see Michel 
2005 (18/19).3
many ways and means to influence it (Mazey and Richardson 1993). Then, an increased role 
of the Parliament was acknowledged as a result of the entry into force of the Single Act, on 
issues related to the single market. In manuals, lobbyists were given the advice to stick to the 
Commission draftsman because he or she often exerted great influence over the 
Commission's attitude towards amendments proposed by the Parliament or the Council at 
the later stages of a legislative proposal.
In the meantime, the situation has changed both at the practitioner and the academic level. 
While the study of European lobbying evolves from a descriptive  into an analytical and 
hypothesis-testing discipline (Coen 2007) the practice of interest representation encompasses 
new institutions, policy areas, instruments and avenues, all of this at a significantly higher 
level of financial and structural commitment. Without any intention to diminish the pivotal 
role the Commission plays due to its right of initiative it is obvious today that with  the 
extension of its legislative powers over the past 20 years the European Parliament has also 
become a preferred addressee of companies, trade associations, public affairs consultants, and 
citizens' action groups. The goals of these organised interests are to transmit selected
information to Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), to underline particular aspects
of the a legislative project and thus to influence the regulatory environment on their behalf or 
on behalf of their clients. They make similar attempts with the Commission and the Council, 
to be sure, but we will see below that changes in the interinstitutional triangle have 
profoundly influenced the way lobbyists perceive the European Parliament and the methods 
they have adopted to work productively in this new decision-making environment. 
Compared to dealing with streamlined hierarchical organisations such as national ministries, 
permanent representations or the Commission there are important caveats when working 
with a heteroclite and multipolar institution such as the European Parliament.
The paper will continue with a short theoretical  discussion of the role of interest 
representation in modern governancec systems. The third section will dicsuss the increased 
use of soft law instruments in EU governance. As in the previous part, the focal point is the
changing perception of the role of government with respect to markets and private actors. 
The fourth part deals with the structures and resources of special interests as well as with the 
measures the European Parliament has taken over the past years to manage its contacts with 
outside organisations. Chapter 5  describes how the European Parliament negotiates 
legislative dossiers, especially in codecision matters, under the new interinstitutional 
framework  and  aims at some tentative conclusions on if and how  interest representation 
could influence it. In a final outlook (part 6) options for the further development of interest 
representation at the European level are discussed.
2 The representation of organised interests and the transformation of legal 
instruments in advanced democratic systems 
The legitimacy of democratic decision systems is usually seen to consist of three components: 
the quality and effectiveness of the political decisions, i.e. their benefit for the citizens 
concerned (output legitimacy); the recruitment, representativeness and accessibility of 
political decision-makers (input-legitimacy); finally, the legitimacy of internal procedures, i.e. 
the legislative and administrative transparency of procedures and decisions, the self-
obligation of the institutions involved to follow rules of good administration, as well as 
sufficient controllability by democratically elected representatives. This threefold legitimacy 4
can be seen as the yardstick to evaluate national as well as European approaches to manage 
organised interest representation. 
After the end of the cold war a change of the role of the state has occurred in most European 
countries.  Government was  transformed from a carrier of sovereign powers to a  service 
provider in an increasing number of domains. Furthermore, a trend towards deregulation 
and  lean government  became  dominant. This  changed not only the distribution of tasks 
between the private and public sectors but also the objectives and instruments of 
governmental activities.  Regulation of economic policies has hence become an important 
object of political science, particularly in network industries such as telecommunications, 
energy or transport. Recent work in this field has been focussed on describing intermediate 
"third way" strategies between old style, interventionist, state-oriented policy-making and 
liberal initiatives to minimise the use of public resources for the implementation of common 
societal interests. In order to avoid a purely negative description of the objectives and the 
utility of state action a recent paradigm develops the concept of the "responsibility-sharing 
ensuring state" which assures the respect of public interests, e.g. in social policy or 
infrastructure, but does not carry out these activities by itself (Schuppert 2006, 236).
The core of the ensuring state concept is a new definition of state action instruments and the 
relationship between non-governmental and state actors. According to traditional legal 
norms there is a hierarchical relationship between public and private acts, the state being 
exempt from competition and directly responsible for the implementation and surveillance of 
most of its activities. More recent theories of governance and regulation stress that 
governance today is part of a network of private actors and negotiated contractual 
relationships. This new division of tasks is characterised by a natural tension between the 
state's dependability as the last instance of many legal or political decisions (e.g., in cases of 
market failure) and its responsibility to provide all citizens with a given set of social or 
economic provisions. The ensuring state implements these provisions through cooperation 
with non-governmental actors but does not necessarily carry them out directly. Hence its first
responsibility  remains to  respect general interests but  to implement them it does not act 
predominantly through legislation but more often through contracting and the creation of 
new types of agencies with characteristics of both public and private institutions.
Consequently, governments and administrations do not have the monopoly for the common 
weal anymore.
In the UK, the desire of both Labour and Tory leaders to make the National Health Service 
independent from direct state interference can be cited as a classic recent example for this 
evolution. The basic idea in both parties seems to be that the underlying raison d'être of the 
NHS is changing from the public provision of health care to the purchase of medical 
treatment from any provider, be it public or private. However, all of this is conditional to the 
continuing requirement of free service for patients. In France, President Chirac has spoken 
out at the Comité économique et social in autumn 2006 in favour of less regulation by law and 
more contractual approaches.
This new division of responsibilities obviously entails new challenges for businesses and 
public authorities alike to negotiate favourable terms for entering into contractual 
relationships. The public side of these negotiations is hence increasingly guided by business
practices such as outsourcing or focussing on core competences. Consultants specialising in 
the public sector often recommend solutions such as public-private partnerships for 
management problems at all levels of public administration. New governance approaches 
can,  however, not eliminate the necessity to have a state which, oriented towards 5
safeguarding the general interest, is able to correct  failures in the non-governmental 
implementation of political, social or economic responsibilities and to function as an 
insurance against inequitable definitions of the general interest. In this role the state cannot 
be dependent on arbitrary choices of private actors or their  varying strength of 
implementation. There are risks that the insight into the necessity of certain regulations is 
sacrificed in order to obtain compromises with strong organised interests. The careful fine-
tuning of private interest representation and intermediation, particularly in directly elected 
institutions, thus  represents a substantial correction factor. Only if all social groups have 
roughly equal chances to shape governance an "open society of public interest interpreters" 
(Schuppert)  can be created without  running the risk to return to a  modern  version of 
corporatism. 
The literature on European governance, too, has elaborated a number of theoretical models 
similar to the above concept of the "ensuring state" (Jachtenfuchs 1998, Kohler-Koch and 
Eising 1999, Lehmann 2002). The European multi-level governance paradigm  is just one 
example where governance  is, on the one hand, understood  as a complex network of 
horizontal and vertical cooperative relationships. On the other, governance is often seen as a 
normative idea to improve the functioning of democratic systems at the European or global 
level. Some years ago, this debate was intensified in the European context by the efforts of the 
European Commission to reform the community method through extensive consultation 
procedures with carefully selected partner organisations and  thus  to improve the input 
legitimacy of European governance.3 The 2006/2007 European Transparency Initiative (ETI) 
follows up on these earlier efforts but includes new elements such as special training 
programmes for Commission officials or internal awareness-raising campaigns.
One aspect of the transformations outlined so far is the increased resort to non-binding 
normative prescriptions in the regulation of markets or other sectors of society. Some 
examples of this at the EU level, such as Interinstitutional Agreements (IIA) or the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC), have been extensively studied for the past five to ten years. 
Other aspects such as the influence of private interests on the choice of regulatory 
instruments still merit more scholarly attention, not least to clarify whether a legal system can 
contain multiple rules of recognition that lead to the system containing multiple, unranked, 
legal sources, with the possibility that they will result in inconsistent rules addressed to 
private actors.
3 The emergence of soft law in European governance
Soft law has always played an important role in European integration and is not a new 
phenomenon. It has been used since the early years of the European Community. In 
particular, Article 249 EC has always explicitly provided for two soft law instruments − 
recommendations and opinions.4
   
3 Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue – General principles and minimum 
standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission (COM(2002)704 fin.
4 "In order to carry out their task and in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, the European 
Parliament acting jointly with the Council, the Council and the Commission shall make regulations 
and issue directives, take decisions, make recommendations or deliver opinions.
[...]
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force."6
Over the years Community institutions have resorted to soft law instruments such as action 
programmes, communications, and similar documents with an increasing frequency. There 
have been also proposals to use soft law as an alternative to EC legislation. An illustration
might be the Communication "Tax Policy in the European Union − Priorities for the years 
ahead."5 Having regarded the difficulties to reach unanimous agreement on legislative 
proposals in the area of European tax policies, the European Commission called on the 
Community to consider the use of alternative instruments such as soft law acts. According to 
the European Commission "the use of non-legislative approaches or 'soft law' legislation may 
be an additional means of making progress in the tax field."
The European Commission has presented various reasons for using soft law rather than 
adopting binding legislation. Among its justifications is that the use of non-legislative (soft 
law) approaches could be particularly effective in cases where they have a firm legal 
foundation, are based on the Treaty, or the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In 
these cases, instruments such as communications, recommendations, guidelines, and 
interpretative notes can provide guidance to Member States on the application of the Treaty 
principles and promote the rapid removal of obstacles to the Internal Market.
The use of soft law can also address, at least to a certain extent, the problem of the asymmetry 
of a legal approach in EC law. This is because, first, these instruments can point to potential 
legal problems and indicate possible ways forward for dealing with them in order to avoid 
legal conflicts or even litigation. Second, soft law approaches can contribute to the 
development of new rules when the ECJ has struck down the old rules as unlawful. The 
downside of using soft law approaches is, however, that they can be very resource-intensive. 
And they are, of course, not directly binding in legal terms.
A large body of soft law has been so far developed by the European institutions. Despite this
proliferation, the EC Treaty has not been adapted to the new reality. Apart from the very 
limited provision in Article 249 concerning the non-binding character of recommendations 
and options, the treaty remains silent on the nature, function, and status of other soft law 
instruments that frequently occur in Community practice. Due to a long-standing tradition of 
soft law in Community law, however, the ECJ has developed a case law on the nature and 
legal status of some soft law instruments.6
For the purpose of this paper, the analysis will focus on examining soft law in the EU 
framework and developed primarily by the European Commission (institutional soft law). 
Although the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament can create soft 
instruments as well, Commission soft law has been an important source of Community rules. 
Given the uncertain status of soft law, however, one might ask in what cases and under 
which conditions soft law instruments are capable of functioning as a satisfactory alternative 
to Community legislation.
Soft law has appeared in the public and scholarly debate as a more or less precisely defined 
term about ten years ago (although there are a few papers published in the early 1990s). For 
the purposes of this paper soft law is defined as "a variety of processes" which "have 
normative content [but ] are not formally binding" (Trubek et al. 2005: 65). According to the 
actors creating such instruments we can distinguish between institutional soft law such as 
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6 See for instance Cases C-322/88 Grimaldi vs Fonds des maladies professionnelles [1989] ECR4407 or 
C-303/90 French Republic vs Commission [1991] ECR I-53157
preparatory, informative, interpretative, steering and decisional instruments, member states' 
soft law or private self- or co-regulation.7 In the EU context, Interinstitutional Agreements 
and the OMC have found particular attention among EU scholars. However, for an analysis 
of the mutual impact of soft law expansion and increased lobbying, instruments which 
include private actors are the most pertinent variety of soft law. According to a definition 
widely adopted by the European institutions, self-regulation concerns a "large number of 
practices, common rules, codes of conduct and, in particular, voluntary agreements which 
economic actors, social players, NGOs and organised groups establish themselves on a 
voluntary basis in order to regulate and organise their activities. Unlike coregulation, self-
regulation does not involve a legislative act. Self-regulation is usually initiated by 
stakeholders." (European Commission 2002: 7).
As co-legislator, the European Parliament was never enthralled with soft law instruments. In 
its resolution on the Commission's White Paper on European Governance of 29 November 
20018 the European Parliament reaffirmed its role of co-legislator and denounced the risk that 
certain proposals made in the White Paper could impinge on the effective exercise of its 
political responsibility. In agreement with the Commission, Parliament also reiterated its 
attachment to the Community method and to its obligation to scrutinise forthcoming 
proposals that would make the political process more open to civil society. On the delegation 
of responsibility to agencies, the  Parliament's resolution basically agreed with the 
Commission’s approach, adding however the request to set the conditions for a call back 
procedure. Moreover, autonomous agencies should be used only if specific scientific or 
technical expertise was required and a decentralised administration seemed appropriate. 
However, this should not lead to a reduction in expert and judicial scrutiny by the 
Commission or to any dilution of the Commission's political accountability. On co-regulation, 
the EP demanded a guarantee for Parliament's appropriate participation in the drafting and 
control of such schemes. Finally, the Parliament recognised the importance of information 
and communication with citizens on the challenges that Europe faces and stressed the role of 
parliamentary debate on politically salient issues to stimulate citizens interest on European 
issues.
Many of the ideas promoted by different actors in the debate on European governance were 
considered a elements of a "sub-treaty" reform of the EU. The uncertain destiny of the Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) has considerably delayed any treaty-based 
changes of European policy-making. In any case, most of the institutional innovations 
contained in this text or its likely (non-constitutional) successor do not directly impinge on 
the practicalities of European governance and interest representation.  There would be 
interesting changes in the Commission's right to implement delegated legislation on " non-
essential elements" of European (framework) laws9, which would certainly require 
Parliament's attention to how it could control these activities. But the problem would scarcely 
be new, reminding us to a large extent of the ongoing issue of comitology and its 
transparency.
In another example of "sub-treaty" reform, Parliament has achieved, after laborious 
negotiations,  a revision of the Council's comitology rules. On 17 July 2006  the Council 
amended the decision laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers 
conferred on the Commission to add a new procedure: regulatory procedure with scrutiny.10
   
7 For a list of examples of these different types of soft law see Peters and Pagotto 2006.
8 OJ C 153 E of 27 June 2002, p. 314
9 Article I-36 TCE
10 Decision 2006/512/EC (OJ L 200 of 22 July 2006).8
This procedure will allow the legislator to oppose the adoption of quasi legislative measures, 
namely measures of general scope 'amending' non-essential elements of basic instruments 
adopted by co-decision, if it considers that the draft exceeds the implementing powers 
provided for in the basic instrument, is incompatible with the aim or the content of that 
instrument or fails to respect the principles of subsidiarity or proportionality. The European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission also adopted a joint statement containing a list 
of legal instruments already in force to be given priority for adjustment under the new 
procedure.
Perhaps the major "sub-treaty" issue that occupied the Parliament over the past few years was 
the debate leading to the IIA on Better Regulation.11 This has notably introduced the idea of 
regulatory impact assessment into European governance. For the most part, however, better 
regulation aims at tidying up and reducing existing legislation and at improving the 
implementation of EU policies by national administrations. It is hence of less relevance for the 
analysis of public-private interactions except that possible impact assessment may become a 
new lobbying avenue for consultants specialising in this activity.
4 Private actors and the stringency of regulation
There is a natural tension between public and private actors in lobbying: each party involved 
in lobbying contacts is interested in different goods. The legislator obtains valuable 
information on the situation in the commercial battle-field and appreciates lobbyists' capacity 
to spread acceptance for a proposal or a bill among the addressees of such a text while the 
interest representative hopes to steer the decision-making process towards the preference 
structure of his or her clients (Michalowitz 2004: 91).
Private interests have an a priori preference for the absence of regulation because, according 
to a classic definition, the essential characteristic of regulation is the limitation of the exercise 
of property rights (Hosli et al. 2004 ?). Hence one of the positions most often taken by 
lobbyists is a preference for auto-regulation of a given economic sector. Auto-regulation 
comes in various guises such as codes of conduct, reporting obligations or autonomous, self-
binding rule-setting without public interference. However, this general principle is subject to 
many exceptions which are usually a function of the competitive situation within or across 
sectors, countries or policies. If for instance lenient or absent regulation leads to the 
predominance of large economic operators in a particular market, small firms may be 
tempted to plead for activist legislation. If the laissez-faire attitude of a national or the 
European legislator brings about competitive advantages for certain companies or countries, 
other actors will probably fight for legislation establishing a level playing field. Non-business 
interests often depend exclusively on governmental activism to promote their political 
agenda in fields such as environmental protection or social legislation. 
The admittedly simplifying principle of a preference for no regulation can be differentiated if 
we take into consideration that hard law and soft law are parts of a continuum lying partly in 
the daylight, partly in the penumbra of law. Specialists of soft law and governance have no 
difficulty of defining particular loci on this continuum, such as "soft acts with a law-plus 
function" (Peters and Pagotto 2006: 2).
   
11 OJ C 321 of 31 December 2003, p. 19
European interest representation: tools and resources
Most manuals for successful interest representation still  emphasise the necessity to get 
involved in the process of political design as early as possible (Guéguen 2007). This usually 
means to develop good contacts with the responsible services of the European Commission.
A few years ago, the Commission had included the comprehensive consultation of regional 
and non-governmental stakeholders in its widely discussed White Paper on European 
Governance12 as an important tool to renew the community method. This was not 
unanimously welcomed. There were critical comments, not least in the Parliament, that the 
White Paper intended to create undemocratic and technocratic pre-legislative mechanisms 
and to evade parliamentary control and effective interest representation (see below).13
One of the crucial questions in the analysis of modern interest representation is, of course, 
how equal opportunity of access to decision-making institutions of different sectors of society 
can be ensured. Hence academic as well as political debates today turn less around the 
question whether interest representation is legitimate than  how interest representation 
should be managed and, in particular, how transparent financial and other networking 
relationships should be. The responsible Commissioner, Siim Kallas, initiated the creation of 
a new data base on lobbying organisations in March 2007, which is meant to replace or 
supplement an Internet resource based on voluntary self-descriptions of the organisations 
involved.14 One of the reasons for this appears to be that the Commission wishes to provide 
much more detailed information on the flows of money that nurture the lobbying networks 
of the European Union. Other issues such as the fair design of the rules used for the control 
and registration of representatives in the Parliament were earlier examples of an awareness 
that interest representation has acquired such an importance that some norms and regulation 
seemed desirable. Such rules can also be seen as qualitative case studies in the framework of a 
functional theory of democratic systems.
The activities of interest  representation and  campaign  associations generally  fall into two
categories: 
- service functions, i.e. the provision of specific (and often exclusive) services for member 
organisations (e.g. the collection and evaluation of inaccessible information);
- direct interest representation, i.e. the attempt to influence decision-making processes from 
the outside (e.g. through contacts with MEPs, officials of the Commission or the 
Parliament or by participation in public hearings);
Other operations include decision making, i.e. the attempt to affect decisions directly from 
the inside (e.g. through membership in expert committees which evaluate and select research 
projects) and implementation, i.e. the participation in political or technical administration
(e.g. by taking on management tasks within the framework of funding programmes). 
The first  two  activities are  the  day-to-day duty of associations, business federations and 
public affairs consultants. In the parliamentary context of interest representation they make 
up the bulk of what is usually called lobbying. The two other aspects of lobbying are found 
more often within the European Commission or, sometimes, the Council or the Permanent 
   
12 OJ C 287 of 12 October 2001, p. 1-29
13 Cf. European Parliament resolution on European governance; OJ C 089 E  of 14 April 2004, p. 103 -
106.
14 COM(2007)127fin.10
Representations of the Member States. They contribute  in some way to public decision 
making and political priority setting in the sense described in the previous section.
The metaphor of the political market is often used to describe lobbying activities. Just as the 
equilibrium price in goods markets is ideally found by the interplay of supply and demand, 
the equilibrium level of influence is determined by the supply and demand of information, 
legitimacy  and other goods provided by officials and politicians, on the one hand, and 
lobbyists, on the other. The immediate parallel of price formation in the commercial market 
would hence be the formation of institutional  consensus in the EU political market.
Nowadays, the general attitude of EP officials towards interests is benevolent. However, the 
fact that we are all now quite experienced in comparing the relative quality and availability of 
lobbying input has made the business of interest representation a more competitive one. 
MEPs and lobbyists: how do they interact?
Former MEP and Chairman of the Environment Committee, Ken Collins, now President of 
the  Scottish Environment Protection Agency and  member of the European Public Affairs 
Consultancies’ Association (EPACA), has repeatedly claimed , probably speaking for many 
other MEPs, that the main problem in the influence market was quality, not quantity. Badly 
prepared and unfocused efforts can be annoying, whereas useful and competent information 
is often welcome to policy-makers. Particularly useful are comparative research and evidence 
that will enable decision-makers to assess the impact of their proposal on the law and 
practices in each of the Member States. One of the suggestions most frequently given by how-
to guides concerns the advantage of being in the game as far upstream as feasible. Hence the 
importance for many consultants to receive crucial SMS messages a few hours earlier than
their competitors. Despite the aversions expressed by many MEPs high-pressure strategies 
are still recommended in many current lobbying manuals.
Besides business representatives Parliament is of course in close contact with organisations 
active in other areas (for instance with ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation), the 
BEUC (Bureau européen des unions de consommateurs) or the IEEP (Institute for European 
Environmental Policy), to name but a few important bodies).  Quantitatively, the Brussels 
influence "market" is of course difficult to assess. Sources rarely agree on the exact number 
and the categorisation of interest groups. In most media articles it is claimed that around 
15.000 people can be considered to work in different categories of interest representation and 
that their total budget is at least between 60 and 90 million Euros (Guéguen 2007).15 The 
European Public Affairs Directory 2007 claims to assemble information on 18.000 "top 
European decision makers", among which are also officials of the EU institutions. The 160 
interested parties that supplied written commentary to the Commission in the context of the 
ETI Green Paper can probably be viewed as the inner circle of Brussels lobbying.16
Think tanks which cover most salient policy areas are the new player on the block in EU 
interest representation. Often financed to a large extent by industry they are nevertheless 
sufficiently removed from direct lobbying to acquire a different standing. Institutes such as 
the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) or the Centre for European Reform (CER) are 
prime examples of dynamic policy entrepreneurs in the provision of all sorts of private and 
   
15 See also Raphael Minder, The lobbyists that have taken Brussels by storm (Financial Times of 19 
January 2006); Der Spiegel of 13 November 2006, p. 165
16 See http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/eti/contributions.htm11
public policy goods. It would be extremely interesting to investigate empirically whether this 
evolution is, at least partially, due to the rise of the EP as a policy-making institution.
Another aspect of increasing professionalisation are hearings where national or regional 
representations (e.g., the Bavarian representation next to the European Parliament) convene 
Commission officials, MEPs, experts and national politicians or civil servants for a debate on 
important policy areas such as water quality or GALILEO. In other words, occasions for an 
exchange of views and for influencing decision makers multiply and make venue shopping a 
necessity for effective lobbying.
Last but not least, the appearance of what could be called trade journals (e.g., the European 
Voice) contributes not only to the creation of a job and information market but also to a more 
homogenous professional self-perception. To work as an public affairs specialist in Brussels 
has become a job description at least as notorious as to be one of Washington's K-Street 
lobbying professionals, even to the outside world.
The degree of Europeanisation of business interests varies according to specific issues and 
Member States' lobbying traditions (Beyers and Kerremans 2007). Still, there has been a trend 
towards direct lobbying strategies which resulted in a marked specialisation according to 
sectors and in ad-hoc alliances based on issues. As many firms began to find their ‘national 
champion’ status under threat, the need was felt to become a member of a Eurogroup, both 
because of the uncertainties presented by the European market and because of the search for 
a ‘Euro champion’ status in particular industries. On the other hand, where Member States 
retain principal authority and responsibility, interests have less reasons to organise at the 
European level. The completion of many components of the Single Market project, the 
important role Member State governments continue to play in implementing and enforcing 
European rules, and the principle of subsidiarity all point to the unrelenting relevance of 
Member State authority (Thomson and Hosli 2006).17 However, the extension of the Single 
Market into new areas such as services has refocused interests on the EU institutions.
The  commencement of the  Single Market project is a distinctive  example of successful 
business lobbying, with a clear boost towards more European integration and a significant 
contribution from the European Parliament. In 1980, a Dutch electronics firm, submitted a 
memorandum  entitled "Europe and Philips - opinions and proposals of a European 
company", which made detailed suggestions on how to create a European Single Market.18 In
1984, a good part of these proposals resurfaced in the "Agenda for Action - Europe in 1990" of 
the ERT, an advisory body of Chairmen of the board and CEOs of big European companies
which had been created in 1983 by Per Gyllenhammar, chairman of Volvo, the Swedish 
carmaker (van Apeldoorn 2000). The Commission then presented a very similar programme 
in its White Paper on the Internal Market. The European Parliament  had already put its 
weight behind the Single Market project in its resolution of 9 April 1984, where it invited the 
Commission to present a proposal for a Council act on the creation of a complete internal 
market.19 Stories like this lend some credibility to the functionalist school of European 
integration although the case for the importance of member states' interests can of course be 
made, too.
   
17 Thomson and Hosli test bargaining models based on previous knowledge of actor preferences and 
arrive at the conclusion that "the Commission and Parliament have substantial weight in the decision-
making process, even though those weights are far less than that of the Council" (413/414).
18 A central request was the elimination of intra-European trade barriers in order to increase the global 
competitiveness of big European firms by lowering costs.
19 OJ C 127 of 14 May 1984, p. 912
5 The European Parliament: policy-making in the face of special interests and 
the member states
Consultation and binding law: a new strategy for private interests? 
Wide consultation is one of the Commission’s duties according to the Treaties and helps to 
ensure that proposals put to the legislature are sound. According to Protocol n° 7 annexed to 
the Amsterdam Treaty, on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, “the Commission should […] consult widely before proposing legislation 
and, wherever appropriate, publish consultation documents”.
There are estimates that approximately 0,5 to 1 million "actors" (i.e., industry groups, regional 
and local authorities, media, small and medium enterprises and trade union associations, 
NGOs, universities, research centres) are regularly in touch with the European institutions.20
About 200 000 of them may already benefit from Community programmes managed by the 
Commission and often expect to have privileged access to future consultation and 
participation processes. Hence there would be a risk of establishing a class of  favoured
groups, firms and institutes if the European institutions, including the Parliament, focused
too exclusively on these well acquainted actors (Eising 2007). The experience made by the 
Commission with the feedback to the White Paper on European Governance indicated, for 
instance, that public, regional and local actors as well as their associations responded with 
numerous contributions and concrete proposals, whereas there was relative silence of many
organisations of civil society, including the social partners, when compared to their degree of 
involvement in the preparatory phase. Recent criticism of the High Level Groups installed by 
Commissioner Verheugen points in the same direction.
In a similar vein, these organisations often have very high expectations on what the Union's 
institutions should be able to do for them. There are regular complaints from civil society 
groups that there is a serious shortage in the European institutions of methods and human 
resources available for managing such a diversity of inputs and for functioning with open 
networks. Some groups require better cooperation and more technical support from 
management staff and other officials for these new consultation tasks. Their wish to influence 
is legitimate but it is also  important to maintain an unbiased definition of the European 
general interest and to organise fairly an ever growing number of consultations.
The European institutions are widely seen, at least by those in regular contact with them, as 
more accessible as many national administrations and governments although they have 
much less publicity with citizens,  associations, universities or cultural institutions. The 
European Commission has been making considerable efforts to bolster its input-legitimacy by 
comprehensive and early consultation of all public and private actors at the very preliminary 
stages of legislative proposals (cf. its Green and White Papers published well in advance of 
many formal proposals). Outside interests provide the Commission with key governance 
resources such as expert knowledge of highly technical dossiers (Bouwen, this volume). 
Consequently, while the Parliament has turned to some regulation of its contacts with outside 
parties (see below), the Commission has long sought to encourage self-regulation amongst 
   
20 Cf. European Governance Newsletter no. 7, European Commission, December 2001.13
the interests themselves and continues to be open for all kinds of third party input. But a 
small number of well organised groups seems to get preferential access to the services. One
consequence of this strategy is the so-called "secondary lobbyism" of less connected
organisations towards groups well placed in the consultation grid.
With respect to its own decision-making and to the role of the legislative authority 
(Parliament and Council) the Commission has made it clear that consultation can never be an 
unlimited or permanent process. In other words, "there is a time to consult and there is a time 
to proceed with the internal decision-making and the final decision adopted by the 
Commission."21 A clear dividing line must be drawn between consultations launched on the 
Commission’s own initiative prior to the adoption of a proposal, and the subsequent 
formalised and compulsory decision-making process according to the Treaties, leading to 
binding legislation which can be attacked by judicial means.
Legal cases such as the recent judgment of the Court of First Instance on France Telecom's 
predatory pricing practices in its homeland22 demonstrate two things: firstly, a general tidal 
change of the allocation of political legitimacy between the national and the European level is 
soon reflected in lobbying strategies (Bouwen and Mccown 2007). While firms might long 
have seen it as too risky or costly an approach to take legal action against the Commission 
such action is nowadays an almost normal instrument of defending company interests with 
respect to binding EU legislation. It means to take advantage of a different political climate 
with respect to the generally accepted depth and width of EU responsibilities and, more 
specifically, the legitimate instruments to be used by the Commission in its role as guardian 
of the treaties. Secondly, the tactics an interest chooses depend entirely on its position in 
different markets. What can be good in one member state can be detrimental in others.
The increasing likelihood and possible outcomes of such litigation is of course brought to the 
attention of MEPs by well-prepared lobbyists when they try to influence related legislative 
proposals that could impinge on their interests. Since a majority of MEPs are convinced that 
such proceedings are rather damaging for the public image of the European institutions and 
know that political attacks levelled against the Commission can tomorrow hit the ECJ and 
next week the European Parliament there is a general sense in the EP that it is crucial to 
avoid, if at all possible, confrontations which could lend themselves to the knee-jerk EU-
criticism cherished by a good number of national media.
Interest groups in the European Parliament: who controls whom?
There is agreement among MEPs and EP civil servants that lobbying has increased 
significantly over the past decade. Some empirical research confirms this anecdotal evidence 
although hard quantitative data are hard to obtain given the informality and confidentiality 
of many contacts (Greenwood 2002). What can clearly be demonstrated is the development of 
new instruments and the professionalisation of European lobbying. It will remain a challenge 
for this type of research to develop reliable indicators that encompass new phenomena such 
as lobbying work carried out by MEPs' assistants or temporary staff placed in committee 
secretariats. Generally speaking, lobbying the European Parliament has most increased in 
those policies where codecision applies (for instance, in Single Market legislation, consumer 
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protection, environmental policy, European networks and transport, research, and European 
citizenship).
Interest representation takes place where decisions are made. Up to the entry into force of the 
Single European Act (SEA) on 1 July 1987 the Commission and the Council were therefore the 
preferred counter parts of non-governmental interest groups, while the European Parliament 
was often viewed as a "phantom Parliament" (Shanks and  Lambert 1962).  After the 
institutional position of the EP had been upgraded with the introduction of new legislative 
procedures  - the co-operation and the co-decision procedures - pressure groups much 
intensified their action with the EP as a new channel of influence. In the early stages, less 
organised interest groups tried to form alliances with the EP on issues that most concerned 
the general public. Apparently the main strategy of these groups consisted in lobbying the 
Commission and the Council as the final targets via the Parliament. This had a considerable 
impact on the institutional balance and its internal dynamics: the Commission and the EP are 
no longer permanent allies representing the European interest but are increasingly becoming 
rivals competing for legitimacy (see below). Relations between the EP and “weaker” civic 
interest groups had the characteristics of what some EU scholars call ‘advocacy coalitions’.
It has been estimated that there are about 70.000 individual contacts per year between the 
Members of the European Parliament and interest groups (Mazey and Richardson 2001). The 
EP comes into the focus of special interests as soon as the rapporteur of the competent 
committee starts to prepare his or her report, and the discussion commences within the 
committee and the political groups. The rapporteur and the committee chair are the main 
gatekeepers in forming the opinion of the EP. Personal acquaintance, nationality, or political 
affiliation that might influence the accessibility and openness of parliamentarians rank 
comparatively low in importance to lobbyists. Assistants, the secretariats of the political 
groups or the EP’s research services are also considered less significant by lobbyists. They 
give preference to staff close to the rapporteur and the secretary of the Committee. Lobbyists 
and MEPs agree that it is most efficient to meet a Member in person. The average MEP still 
receives most of the requests for help and support by letter or e-mail but surprise visits in the 
office are also part of the game.
The fact that a large fraction of MEPs are not ready to accept industry rationales at face value 
obliges trade associations and other business groups to find a wider range of policy goods to 
offer: it is not sufficient to advertise positive effects for some European industries if a clear 
majority of MEPs is to be convinced. Public goods such as a cleaner environment or higher 
employment need to be included in the political equation.
Moreover, Rule 2 of the EP’s Rules of Procedure specifies that Members shall not be bound by 
any instructions and shall not receive a binding mandate. To agree to vote in a particular way 
in exchange for whatever advantages a lobbyist may be prepared to offer would be 
tantamount to accepting a “binding mandate”. Contrast this to some lobbying techniques, for 
instance those described by Scottish MEP Catherine Stihler: MEPs are phoned by lobbyists 
demanding urgent meetings or find them knocking on the office door without an 
appointment; sometimes Members wonder how a lobbyist got there in the first place. 
However, some tactics are more disturbing than others. For instance, during the debates on 
Parliament's reports on the biotechnology directive, some MEPs complained about the 
bombardment of letters and phone calls from companies such as SmithKline Beecham, 
Boehringer, or Aventis. MEPs expressed their hope that such pressures brought to bear by 
outside organisations would not happen again. The specialised press continues to report 15
doubtful efforts by pressure groups to influence Parliament's internal procedures, e.g. to 
avoid certain MEPs as rapporteurs for subjects for which they are known to be critical.23
From a Parliament standpoint the policy area is by far the most important variable that 
influences both its own institutional demands on consulting input and the level of lobbying 
activity it is confronted with. As a democratically elected institution it is particularly sensitive 
to issues which suddenly receive focussed public attention. Examples such as the services 
directive or the passenger data agreement with the United States show that press coverage, 
sometimes combined with legal proceedings covered by the specialised media, is a 
determining factor both for the supply and the demand side of the opinion market.
Institutional responses to increased lobbying
The first step to find solutions to the problems  described in the previous section was a 
Written Question tabled by Alman Metten, in 1989. In 1991, Marc Galle, Chairman of the 
Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Verification of Credentials and Immunities, was 
appointed to submit proposals for a code of conduct and a register of lobbyists. Galle’s 
proposals included: a code of conduct with minimalist standards aimed at preventing abuse 
(such as prohibiting the  sale of documents and the  use of institutional premises); the 
establishment of ‘no go’ areas in the Parliament’s buildings including members’ offices and 
library facilities; examination of the role of lobbying with intergroups; and, taking an idea 
from the United States, the registration of lobbyists on an annual basis, spelling out the rights 
and obligations of those on the register, and specifying penalties for failure to comply. A 
final, and contentious proposal required MEPs annually to state their financial interests and 
those of their staff, on a separate register. Since no consensus could be reached as regarded 
the proposed definition of interest groups and the financial interests of MEPs and their staff, 
the report was finally not discussed in the plenary  part-session. One reason behind this 
failure was the time pressure of the upcoming EP elections in 1994. The most substantive 
problem, however, were the controversies on the definition of what constituted a "lobbyist".
After the 1994 elections, a second attempt at regulating lobbying was undertaken by the 
Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Verification of Credentials and Immunities, which, 
by letter of 10 August 1994, requested authorisation to draw up a report on lobbying in the 
European Parliament (Glyn Ford was later appointed rapporteur) and on the declaration of 
Members' financial interests (rapporteur: Jean-Thomas Nordmann). Mr Ford first asked for a 
study by Parliament's research services of the rules governing lobbying in the national 
parliaments of the Member States, thereby making the connection to issues of standards in 
public life which had arisen on the political agendas of many countries in the years before. 
The study showed that Member States with provisions governing the activities of interest 
groups or their representatives were the exception (notably Germany and the UK).
Avoiding the above-mentioned terminological difficulties, Mr Ford proposed a scheme of 
great simplicity. In its original form, it proposed that the College of Quaestors should issue 
permanent passes to persons who wished to enter Parliament frequently with a view to 
supplying information to Members within the framework of their parliamentary mandate. 
   
23 For example, according to the European Voice of 9-15 January 2003 (p. 7) a business association 
representing British makers of food flavourings wrote to MEP Phillip Whitehead, Member of the 
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy, asking him to oppose a Danish 
colleague's appointment as rapporteur.16
Later on, the Ford report became concerned not only with regulating the activities of 
lobbyists, but also with those of parliamentarians, and the incremental extension of its scope 
led to spirited political debates among the principal groups.
In 1996, the Ford (and the Nordmann) reports were successfully submitted to the plenary 
after a first version had been referred back to the Committee in both cases.24 The Ford report 
proposed amendments to the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, according to which the 
Quaestors should grant interest representatives a pass in exchange for acceptance of a code of 
conduct and registration. With regard to financial interests, each MEP is now required to 
make a detailed declaration of his professional activities. MEPs have to refrain from accepting 
any gift or benefit in the performance of their duties. Registered assistants also have to make 
a declaration of any other paid activities. The rules currently in force are annexed to the Rules
of Procedure of the Parliament. In a further resolution based on a second report drawn up by 
Mr Ford, Parliament decided to supplement the Rules with a Code of Conduct for lobbyists 
(to become Article 3 of annex IX to the Rules).25 The register of lobbyists provided for in the 
Rule 9 (2) of Parliament's Rules of Procedure has been available on the Internet for some time 
now.26
There are several explanations for its lengthy quest of a consensus on the regulation of 
lobbying and that of financial interests: persisting national differences in political culture, 
lack of a European regulation replacing national rules, different cultural and judicial attitudes 
towards lobbying in general. The EP’s approach to enhance transparency should of course 
differ from that of the Commission, because each of the EU institutions should adapt its 
methods to the role it plays in decision-making. While the Commission as the agenda-setter 
wishes to keep an open dialogue and provides only minimum standards of self-regulation, 
the EP, as a pluralistic institution participating in legislation, requires institutional structures 
to secure transparency and the building of stable majorities. It was suggested that “the EP 
should try to reduce the immense options of pluralism to an easily comprehensible number 
of options and actors. The regulation of lobbying should contribute to an aggregation of 
interests and not a fragmentation and a pluralisation of interests” (Schaber 1998). Another 
critical  observer arrives at the conclusion that "the difference between the schemes put 
forward by the Commission and the Parliament is that the former has sought means of 
ensuring wider-ranging consultation, whereas the latter may further privilege the already 
privileged" (Greenwood 1998).
In interinstitutional comparison the European  Parliament is  probably  as  open as the 
Commission, according to lobbyists. Access to the Council, for instance, is far more difficult. 
But the majority of lobbyists are aware that they have to face varying degrees of acceptance in 
the Parliament. They attribute this to reservations based on national culture and political 
allegiance. There is, e.g., a clear North-South division between countries familiar with 
professional lobbying and those where this industry is still in its infancy. Professional 
lobbying by public-affairs consultants is well known in the UK, for instance, but less in Latin 
countries and Germany (although the latter is rapidly catching up since the federal 
government moved to Berlin). Unsurprisingly, Conservative and Liberal parties more open to 
producer interest group lobbying than Social Democratic or Green Parties, whereas the 
opposite situation may be found with some civic interests. With certain Members, consultants 
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have a reputation of being too pushy. As many of them represent clients' interests, some 
MEPs do not consider them as players that they should rely on or include in their personal
network. When evaluating interest positions on a given policy issue, MEPs mostly give 
preference to those outside interests that either represent a broad constituency such as trade 
unions, social movements or political parties, or those that can provide them with an 
aggregate view on the most efficient ways to deal with the problems and economic 
consequences. 
One lobbyist recommends that "lobbyists should be alert to opportunities to make individual 
rapporteurs 'shine' in the eyes of their colleagues. Well-crafted legislative reports, based on 
careful investigation and meticulous analysis, can enhance the reputation of a newly elected 
MEP. And a reputation for diligence and intellectual acumen can lead to leadership positions 
in the future" (Buholzer  1998). Indeed, to a large extent MEPs act as individuals. 
Nevertheless, to secure re-election they will try to make use of interest groups and improve 
their reputation in the constituency and the national party. MEPs also rely on information 
from interest groups, chiefly if they are expected to make well thought-out judgements about 
technical details and scientific expertise. Lobbyists recognise that it is not in their interest to 
be suspected of underhand practices. Good relations with major EU institutions are essential 
for most of them.
Bicephalic policy-making: new  interinstitutional interactions
Relations between the Commission and the Parliament have been often described and their 
relative influence is the subject of much legal and social science research on EU decision 
making. The claim put forward here is that the working relationships between the 
Commission and the Parliament have mainly changed because of a new style of collaboration 
between the Parliament and the Council (Jacobs 2005). The brokering activities of senior 
figures of the European Parliament, often lobbying their own governments, are now much 
more evident. This is obviously of great interest for campaigners and lobbying firms. Their 
resource allocation between the national and the European level may change as a result of 
this evolution. On the other hand, Parliament's institutional demands have also changed in 
the context of achieving a compromise at the latest stages of legislation and under close 
public scrutiny.
Only a few years ago the first legislative acts were adopted under the codecision procedure 
and signed by the Presidents of the EP and the Council, now customarily called the two 
branches of the "legislative authority".27 This label has been applied in the framework of the 
community budget ("budgetary authority") but not in the early years of co-decision. The fact 
that in many cases it is not the Council alone which adopts EU directives or regulations has 
taken years to become common knowledge, even in the world of Brussels interest 
representation.  Still today, the treaty refers only to the Council as the decision-making 
institution, even where co-decision applies. This would change with the entry into force of 
the constitutional treaty. In any case the year 2006 saw the highest percentage ever of acts 
adopted under codecision. Table 1 also demonstrates that the importance of first reading 
agreements has almost continuously risen since the entry into force of the Amsterdam treaty
(1999 and 2004 were election years). The mechanisms to achieve agreements at the first 
reading have been further specified and formalised with the latest revision of the Joint 
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Declaration on Practical Arrangements for the Codecision Procedure currently examined by 
Parliament and to be formally adopted soon. The Joint Declaration also enhances Parliament's 
profile at the moment of signature of an act  commonly adopted with the Council (ceremony 
and press conference).
Table 1:
Percentage of acts adopted in 1st, 2nd and 3rd reading under the codecision procedure since 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1 May 1999)
1999* 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1st reading 5 12 21 16 32 41 34 58
2nd reading 19 30 26 45 46 37 19 35
3rd reading 5 19 20 15 15 14 0 10
Total 29 61 67 76 93 92 53 103
* from 1 May
Source: European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies
The increasing application of the codecision procedure has had an impact both intra- and 
interinstitutionally. It is important for consultants, campaigners and other lobbyists to 
understand that inside Parliament committee rapporteurs and, to a lesser extent, chairmen 
are strongly attached to the substantive political issues under examination and fight for what 
they see as the best regulatory outcome in a given policy field. This is not to say that there is 
no influence from other strong figures of the political groups or from the (informal) national 
delegations. However, this sort of pressure, mostly quite unrelated to the technical aspects of 
the original dossier, mounts considerably with the advancement of a draft act to the 
conciliation stage. There may hence be tensions between the (political) 'experts' of the 
responsible committee (who are in any case losing their direct influence) and the conciliation 
specialists who tend to see Parliaments institutional position or the power of their political 
group as determining factors of their posture in negotiations with the Council. Naturally, 
there are tactical calculations on whether it is to Parliament's (or a committee's) advantage to 
conclude or not at the first reading.
Interinstitutionally, there was relatively little contact between the EP and Council staff, except 
perhaps in the budgetary procedure, until the end of the 1980s. Developments on legislative 
texts within the Council were generally communicated to the Parliament by Commission 
officials. Under the old consultation procedure the EP's role, always relatively weak, 
practically ceased once it had given its opinion, and the main deals were then done between 
the Commission and the Council. The cooperation procedure introduced by the Single 19
European Act complicated the situation, and gave greater bargaining power to the EP, but 
still left it in a weaker position than the other two institutions. The introduction of codecision, 
however, led to a new triangular relationship (in the legislative field) between the three 
institutions and thus to a much closer direct relationship between the EP and the Council, 
including between their respective staffs.
Ministers from countries holding the Presidency now not only address the Parliamentary 
committees within their area of responsibility at the beginning of their term of office 
(normally in order to outline their priorities and work programme), but increasingly offer to 
debrief committees at the end of their term of office on what they have achieved, notably at 
their Council meetings. The way in which these Ministerial presentations have been treated 
by EP committees is also evolving, with some committees (and Presidencies) seeking to move 
away from "pro forma" presentations of Presidency shopping lists to more in-depth 
discussions on matters of substance. 
Presidency Ministers now routinely call on the relevant committee chairmen (and sometimes 
political group coordinators within the committees as well), typically before their Presidency 
has started to discuss future cooperation during their term-of-office, but also just before they 
address the committee or even on other occasions., such as when they are in Brussels for the 
final stages of conciliation negotiations. Even Ministers from countries not holding the 
Presidency are having increasing contacts with committees and with their chairmen.
There has also  been a slow evolution with respect to active  contributions from Council 
representatives other than Ministers. Not only Presidency but other Council working group 
representatives are increasingly present in EP committee meetings when legislative issues are 
being discussed. Moreover, the representatives present are usually technical experts from the 
Ministry in question, and know best what is at stake within the Council. The Commission, 
which is present at Council discussions, can also outline the state of Council discussions, but 
it may have a different perspective. It would obviously be of great value also to hear it 
directly from Council officials.
Furthermore, there are many informal contacts between EP and Council secretariat staff on 
co-decision files but Council officials avoid to name and shame particular delegations 
attempting to block progress or push through their special interest. All these considerations 
help to explain Council reluctance to speak in EP committee meetings There are signs, 
however, that this is beginning to change. EP committee staff know their counterparts on the 
Council secretariat, and in some cases may have regular formal meetings every 3 or 4 months 
with them to discuss horizontal legislative problems, timing of transmission of common 
positions, etc. Regular contacts also take place between the two institutions' respective 
conciliation services. There are other areas where new informal practices are being developed 
between the EP and the Council.
The position of the Parliament with regard to the Council is now stronger than it was, and 
there are far more direct contacts between the two institutions, as well as more scope for 
occasional coalitions against the Commission. What is unclear is the extent to which the EP's 
increasing influence in the codecision and budgetary contexts will spill over into areas where 
the EP has less formal powers, such as international trade agreements, justice and home 
affairs or foreign policy matters, cross-cutting issues such as the Lisbon Process, or non-
legislative (and intergovernmental !) procedures such as the OMC. There may also be some 
resistance coming from within the Parliament against too cosy relationships with the Council 
Presidency or other big member states. For instance, the recent close (and effective) 20
cooperation between two German group leaders and the German government in some very 
important dossiers caused some misgivings among MEPs of other groups or nationalities.
Two basic lessons may be drawn by lobbyists and campaigners from this newly designed 
playing field: the Parliament can act differently at different stages of the legislative procedure 
(for instance, at the committee level in a first reading agreement or at the conciliation level in 
a third reading agreement) and the Parliament can be a valuable source of information on the 
state of play not only as concerns it inner workings but also the balance of positions in the 
Council. To reap these fruits, however, close observation of the proceedings and knowledge 
of the essential players and their staff are crucial.
Future research should certainly address the question of whether closer cooperation between 
the Parliament and the Council enhances or reduces the risk of the legislative authority to be 
captured by special interests. For a long time, European governance was quite isolated from 
public pressure, leading to an increased importance of more confidential exertion of political 
influence, such as lobbying (Michel 2005: 17). However indirectly, the European Parliament 
has succeeded in introducing or provoking some elements of popular democracy in the 
European political arena, such as demonstrations of unions or citizens' action groups. Recent 
examples include demonstrations in Strasbourg protesting against some liberalising elements 
of the ports and the services directives as well as movements against the dilution of the 
REACH directive on chemicals. While such events are still much more exceptional than at the 
national level, they clearly show the impact of a directly elected and majoritarian institution 
not only on the rules of legislative decision-making but also on the logic of influence.
6 Outlook
The difficult transition from negative to positive integration (Scharpf 1998) has been amply 
demonstrated for macroeconomic and social public policies. However, the private sector faces 
similar challenges which have changed their approach, for instance, to recent proposals for 
completion of the single market. As mentioned above, the single market project was 
unabashedly welcomed by industry, trade and banking interests as long as it constituted 
primarily the removal of barriers to trade, direct investment and capital transfers. Projects 
such as the services directive, the roaming charges regulation or the single European 
payment area meet much less enthusiasm from private interests because they risk to benefit 
consumers or workers to the detriment of profit-making, or because they are required 
because of factors not directly linked to the economy (for instance, the passenger data dispute 
with the United States). Hence the repeated calls from interest representations for self-
regulation, soft-law instruments or even out-right rejection of some recent Commission 
proposals. In this new lobbying environment, where there is only qualified support from 
business interests for many proposals but intense pressure from other activists the European 
Parliament has become an important arena for fleshing out difficult compromises. One of the 
challenges of developing an evidence-based theory of lobbying will be to create models of 
lobbying strategies as a function of the type of integration envisaged by a new proposal.
Pluralistic democratic systems are supposed to give to all economic and social actors the 
chance not only to represent their private interests but also to express their views on how to 
balance interests in the shared public space between government, civil society and private 
individuals making choices about how they want to live. The idea of a state less inclined to 
claim supreme authority and extended to the multi-level governance system of the European21
Union is part of an evolution towards public authorities which negotiate contractual 
relationships more than they enact binding legislation. Transparency and fair access to 
decision-making institutions will continue to be highly important in such a system. The 
crucial issue has been and will be how to compensate for different levels of organisational 
proficiency among interest groups in order to include all relevant positions into the 
framework of negotiations and to arrive at balanced political priorities.
The concept of the "ensuring state" places the duty to provide equitably for the public good at 
the centre of its responsibilities. Its guiding principle is hence to transform non-state actors' 
calculations to maximise their individual benefit into civic contributions to broader societal 
interests. Strong control mechanisms are necessary if there is to be a chance to arrive at such 
transformations. Whether the European Parliament specifically is in need of stronger control 
of its relations with private interests is an open question to which the results of the renewed 
debate on lobbying will bring the answer. True, its current rules date back to the mid 1990s
but compared to many Member States this does not seem particularly  irresponsible.
However, in a recent Working Document, the Committee on Budgetary Control called for 
'greater scrutiny of lobbying activities'.28 The Committee on Constitutional Affairs will 
prepare a resolution on the constitutional aspects of interest representation which is expected 
to arrive at the plenary in autumn 2007.
The fine-tuning of interest representation in the European Parliament can also be seen as a 
contribution to the establishment of new public behavioural norms. European institutions 
would be in a much weaker position in dealing with national administrations if they had not 
their comprehensive knowledge of local situations and technical details. To an important 
extent they derive this legitimacy from non-state partners. On the other hand there is always 
a risk of instrumentalisation for private agendas. Two-level games to  exploit political 
differences between the national and the European level must be watched, too.
The European multi-level structure has given birth to a multi-layered system of different 
levels and sectors of organised and aggregate interest representation. Some authors see a 
certain fragmentation of European interest representation over the past ten years (Grande 
2001).  Contacts between decision-makers and interests are seemingly less dependent on 
centralised  associations or federations which often announce compromise positions of little 
appeal for the majority of their members.
The further evolution of the structure and the rules of interest representation with the 
European Parliament is difficult to anticipate. Considering the intensification of lobbying that 
was recently much covered by the media and the improved access of many groups to the 
public authorities of national capitals (Germany being a particularly instructive case) it 
would, however, be surprising if the European Parliament adopted a more restrictive 
posture. Even  though the frequency and intensity of European legislation are likely to 
continue to decrease over the next years this might be compensated by further enlargement 
and the increasing openness of some national cultures for lobbying in the traditional sense.
Besides, tight public budgets should lead to increased competition for public funds and hence 
for re-energized competitive lobbying at all levels of socio-economic and regulatory policy-
making. Finally, the increase of the information load and the professionalisation of interests 
make it reasonable to expect an upsurge  in political consultancy, which is often hardly 
discernible from classic lobbying. In any case, the new interinstitutional arrangements will 
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have to be factored in when devising an effective approach of interest representation at all 
levels.
This still leaves us with the question of the relationship between interests and the expansion 
of soft law. Without a dense "shadow of hierarchy" (Peters and Pagotto 2006: 15) soft law 
instruments would probably have less efficiency and compliance. In fact, recent research on 
the OMC, for instance, argues for its "communautarisation" in order to cure obvious pitfalls 
of the highly intergovernmental present approach. The application and the effects of the 
OMC should be more clearly defined and better integrated with the other pre-existing forms 
of cooperation within the EU, in accordance with basic requirements stemming from the 
Community legal order (Hatzopoulos 2007). This knowledge is, of course, part of the 
lobbying equation and leads towards a graduated strategy on the parts of interest 
representation: having to account for the ever present possibility of a hard law reaction from 
the public EU actors they attenuate their demands for less or no regulation and accept the 
need to provide support for the achievement of certain public policy goals. It would hence 
make it more difficult for the EU's bodies to insist on their institutional demands if private 
interests knew that hard law was out of the question.
As we have seen above, soft law may be considered as an alternative for hard law by some 
special interests. However, seen from the perspective of the public actor this "para-law" 
function (Peters and Pagotto 2006: 23) is not really the choice to be made. In most cases, the 
alternative to soft law is not hard law but no regulation at all. It is more often than not a 
"realistic" second-best solution, an escape from a political impasse and not a deliberate choice. 
There is clearly a limit to the influence of lobbying on the process of choosing a particular 
legislative tool. Typically, it is within the public institutions entitled to legislate that resistance 
to hard law is building up. However, it is a challenge for future lobbying research to establish 
possible contributions of private interests in the build-up of such resistance.
Finally, the variety of soft law tools is certainly an effective method to integrate non-state 
actors in the regulatory and legislative decision-making of the European Union. This is 
obvious for subjects such as technical norms or financial regulation, where private associa-
tions like the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) or the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) command technical expertise and long-term experience to an extent 
which would be difficult to acquire by political or juridical institutions. The World 
Meteorological Organization's and United Nations Environment Programme's Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change may also serve as an illustration of a new approach to tackle 
scientifically difficult matters lacking clear causal relationships through an intensive 
collaboration of non-state scientific institutions and states. Although other programmes like 
the Lisbon process, having no central "legislator of last resort", show the limits of non-binding 
benchmarking, naming and shaming, and other normative instruments (Schäfer 2004), soft 
law certainly expands the possibilities for an intensive exchange of practices and norms 
between the public and the private realm. It may not be a new "world order" (Slaughter 2004) 
but it might help governments to operate better in a highly fluid and complicated environ-
ment. The future may thus be in hybrid combinations29 of hard and soft law with strong and, 
hopefully, transparent inputs from competent private actors. -
   
29 For a defense of the concept of "hybridity" see Trubek et al. 2006 (93 ff).23
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